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Abstract—Blockchain technologies provide excellent architectures and practical tools for
securing and managing the sensitive and private data stored in biometric templates, but at a
cost. We discuss opportunities and challenges in the integration of blockchain and biometrics,
with emphasis in biometric template storage and protection, a key problem in biometrics still
largely unsolved. Key tradeoffs involved in that integration, namely, latency, processing time,
economic cost, and biometric performance are experimentally studied through the
implementation of a smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain platform, which is publicly
available in github for research purposes.
BLOCKCHAIN AND BIOMETRICS are two of
the most disruptive technologies of this era.1
Blockchain technology provides an immutable
and decentralized data registry, optionally with
the capability of executing distributed code in
a secure way. Its origins are linked to Bitcoin
cryptocurrency (2009), solving an old opened
problem in the cryptographic community since
the 80’s: the design of a distributed algorithm of
consensus on economic transactions without the
participation and control of a central authority.
Nevertheless, nothing prevents any other digital
data from being stored in the blockchain instead
of just economic transactions. This aspect opens
the doors to many different potential applications
such as smart energy and grids [1], healthcare [2],
and smart devices or digital identity schemes [3],
among others.
Biometrics could be one of these potential
applications to make the most of blockchain
technology. From its origins in the early 60’s up
to now, a significant progress has been achieved,
incorporating them in most daily devices such as
smartphones. Biometrics refers to the automated
recognition of individuals through the use of
1https://github.com/BiDAlab/BlockchainBiometrics
physiological (e.g., face, fingerprint) or behav-
ioral (e.g., voice, handwritten signature) traits [4].
Its main advantages over traditional authentica-
tion methods are: i) no need to carry tokens
or remember passwords, ii) they are harder to
circumvent, and iii) provide at the same time a
stronger link between the subject and the action
or event.
However, and despite the advantages and po-
tential of each of them, blockchain and biometrics
have been largely developed independently so far.
Some questions arise in this regard: what benefits
could achieve the combination of them? what
challenges and limitations should be considered
for their integration?
As a first approximation, blockchain could
provide biometrics with some desirable features
such as immutability, accountability, availability
or universal access [5]. These properties enabled
by blockchain technology may be very useful,
among other applications in biometrics, to secure
the biometric templates [6], and to assure privacy
in biometric systems [7].
Blockchain technology could also take advan-
tage of biometrics in many different ways, e.g.,
improving the current distributed digital identity
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Table 1. Blockchain technology taxonomy. Consensus algorithms, PoW (proof-of-work), PoS (proof-of-stake), PoA
(proof-of-authority), PoI (proof-of-importance), BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerance). ?NEM can be also configured as a
public blockchain.
Type
(Read access)
Access control
(Write access) Main platforms
Consensus
algorithm Participants
Data
privacy
Smart contract
capability
Transaction
confirmation
time
Associated
cryptocurrency
Public
Permissionless Bitcoin Proof-of-work
Anonymous
No No
Long
(minutes)
BTC
Ethereum PoW (now)PoS (after Casper) No Yes ETH
Permissioned Quorum Flexible (Raft, BFT, PoA) Optional Yes -Ripple XLCP (Byzantine based) No No XRP
Private
Permissionless LTO PoI Identified,
trusted
Yes Yes
Short
(seconds)
-
Parity (Ethereum) PoA Yes Yes -
Permissioned Hyperledger Flexible (PBFT) Yes Yes -NEM? PoI Yes Yes -
schemes on blockchain. Another interesting appli-
cation is related to smart devices. A smart device
is any digital or physical asset with access to a
blockchain that can perform actions and make
decisions based on the information stored there.
For example, a car could be fully managed (rented
or bought) through a smart contract. However,
an adequate identification of the user is not fully
solved yet. In this case, an authentication protocol
based on biometrics could significantly raise the
current security level.
1. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain is essentially a decentralized pub-
lic ledger of all data and transactions that have
ever been executed in the system. These trans-
actions are recorded in blocks that are created
and added to the blockchain in a linear and
chronological order (immutable). But, who is in
charge of the correct operation of the blockchain
network? Any electronic device, including com-
puter, phone or even a printer, as long as it is
connected to the Internet and as such has an IP
address. These electronic devices are known as
nodes, and their main roles are: i) maintaining a
copy of the blockchain, and ii) validating relaying
transactions, and copying them in the blockchain.
Since its initial application to Bitcoin cryp-
tocurrency, the original idea of a universal and
public blockchain has greatly evolved into new
architectures.
1.1. Architectures
Blockchain technology is not a monolithic
concept any more. It can be classified according
to different criteria [8]. The most significant clas-
sifications are related to the access/control layer
and the consensus algorithms. Table 1 shows a
taxonomy of the most popular blockchain tech-
nologies regarding type, access control, platform,
consensus algorithm, participants, data privacy,
smart contract capability, time, and associated
cryptocurrency.
According to the first criterion, blockchains
are usually categorized as public and private. The
first type allows anyone to join the network, and
read or write data and transactions. Therefore,
public blockchains are usually designed with a
built-in economic incentive for allowing anony-
mous and universal access. This incentive purpose
is twofold: i) it encourages the participation of
users in the network, which is important for the
consensus algorithm and provides security; and ii)
it encourages the generation of more cryptocur-
rency. This process uses a mining mechanism
based on the resolution of computationally in-
tensive cryptographic puzzles. The most popular
blockchain platforms belong to this group, e.g.,
Bitcoin or Ethereum.
Private blockchains, on the other hand, impose
constrains in the admission process to the network
(through authentication of the nodes using X.509
certificates, for example). For this reason, private
blockchains are mainly considered in applications
where users must be fully identified and trusted.
In some cases, permissions for reading and
writing are segregated, obtaining different combi-
nations of public/private (for the reading access),
and permissionless/permissioned blockchains (for
the writing access). For example, in a public per-
missioned blockchain any participant could freely
join the network, but there would be some kind of
control over who could read or write transactions.
In addition, in order to protect the privacy of
transactions, the data is typically encrypted.
Finally, some authors also consider an in-
termediate architecture between public and pri-
vate blockchains, called consortium blockchains.
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These architectures are permissioned, partially
private and with semi-decentralized architectures,
specially considered in business and financial
scenarios with a small number of participants.
1.2. Smart Contracts
Apart from storing data, blockchain technol-
ogy reaches their full potential through the so-
called smart contracts. A smart contract is, es-
sentially, a piece of code executed in a secure
environment that controls digital assets. This is
a very well-known concept inside the crypto-
graphic community. Some examples of these se-
cure environments include regular servers con-
trolled by “trusted parties”, decentralized net-
works (blockchains), or servers with secure hard-
ware (e.g., SGX) [9].
Many public blockchains support the execu-
tion of smart contracts, but Ethereum [10] is
currently considered the most reliable, secure and
used. In essence, Ethereum could be seen as a
distributed computer, with capability to execute
programs written in Turing-complete, high-level
programming languages. These programs com-
prise a collection of pre-defined instructions and
data that have been recorded at a specific address
of a blockchain. For biometric purposes, a smart
contract running in a blockchain can assure a
semantically correct execution.
1.3. Challenges and Limitations
Despite the advantages and new opportuni-
ties already described, the combination of both
blockchain and biometrics is not straightforward
due to the limitations of the current blockchain
technology. Among them, it is important to re-
mark: i) its transaction processing capacity is
currently very low (around tens of transactions
per second), ii) its actual design implies that all
system transactions must be stored, which makes
the storage space necessary for its management to
grow very quickly, and iii) its robustness against
different types of attacks has not been sufficiently
studied yet.
We now discuss the limitations of blockchain
public networks for the deployment and operation
of biometric systems.
• Economic cost of executing smart con-
tracts: in order to support smart contracts in
blockchains (like Ethereum), and to reward
the nodes that use their computing capacity to
maintain the system, each instruction executed
requires the payment of a fee in a cryptocur-
rency (called gas). Simple instructions (such as
a sum) cost 1 gas, while others can cost signif-
icantly more (e.g., the calculation of a SHA3
hash costs 30 gas). Additionally, the storage
space is especially expensive (around 20k gas
for every 256 bits). Therefore, one of the first
research problems would be minimizing the
cost of running a biometric system (totally
or partially) in a blockchain, which includes
developing efficient ways to code biometrics
modules in smart contracts.
• Privacy: by design, all operations carried out
in a public blockchain are known by all the
participating nodes. Thus, it is not possible to
directly use secret cryptographic keys, as this
would reduce the number of potential applica-
tions. Regarding privacy in public blockchains,
three main layers are considered in general: i)
participants, ii) terms, and iii) data. The first
one ensures participants to remain anonymous
both inside and outside of the blockchain.
This is achieved with cryptographic mecha-
nisms like ring signatures, stealth addresses,
mixing, or storage of private data off-chain.
Second, privacy of terms keeps the logic of the
smart contracts secret, by using range proofs or
Pedersen commitments. Finally, and the most
important for biometrics, the goal of the data
privacy layer is to keep transactions, smart
contracts, and other data such as biometric
templates, encrypted at all times, both on-
chain and off-chain. The cryptographic tools
used include zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP)
and zk-SNARKS, Pedersen commitments, or
off-chain privacy layers like hardware-based
trusted execution environments (TEEs). How-
ever, the application of these cryptographic
tools are still very limited for blockchains. For
example, Ethereum just included at the end of
2017 basic verification capabilities for ZKPs.
More advanced cryptographic tools have been
only developed to target special cases like
Aztec [11] or ZK range proofs [12]. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that ZKP transactions
would be expensive and computationally inten-
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sive (∼ 1,5M gas/verification).
• Processing capability: another important lim-
itation is related to its processing capability.
Ethereum, for example, is able to run just
around a dozen transactions per second, what
it could be not enough for some scenarios.
Additionally, there is a minimum confirmation
time before considering that the transaction has
been properly added to the blockchain. This
time can oscillate among different blockchains,
from tens of seconds to minutes, reducing its
usability for biometric systems.
• Scalability: this is one of the main handicaps
of the technology from its origin as, theoreti-
cally, all nodes of the blockchain network must
store all blocks of the blockchain network.
Currently, the size of the public blockchains
(Bitcoin and Ethereum) is around 200GB, but
this is growing very fast. This can be a problem
for some application scenarios such as the
Internet of Things (IoT).
• Security: as novel technology, blockchain
security characterization is still a work in
progress. Among all possible attacks, it is
worth mentioning the attack known as “51%
attack” [13]. If an attacker gains more than
50% of the computational capacity of any
public or private blockchain, he could reverse
or falsify transactions. This attack applies even
to blockchain with consensus algorithms not
based in proof-of-works schemes, like PoS
or PoA, typically used in private or consor-
tium topologies. However, the main security
problems suffered to date are mainly related
to programming errors, e.g., the DAO attack
happened in 2016, which put at risk the whole
Ethereum ecosystem [14].
2. BLOCKCHAIN AND BIOMETRICS
Once the essential concepts of the blockchain
technology have been discussed, the question is:
which is the most appropriate architecture for the
integration of biometric technology? The short
answer is: it depends.
According to the challenges and limitations
analyzed in the previous section, one can think
that private architectures are clearly the most
appropriate. However, public blockchains provide
a higher level of security, precisely because of
the mining process used in their consensus al-
gorithms. This makes the system more robust
against collusion attacks, in which a number of
participants manipulate transactions to deceive
the rest.
Imagine, for example, a biometric system de-
ployed in a private blockchain. This architecture
will force the number of users to be small,
since they must be fully identified and trusted.
This would limit potential uses, such as a digital
identity scheme beyond a company or individual
institution. Moreover, if all users must be identi-
fied, it is likely that blockchain technology is not
actually needed (better solutions may exist).
Therefore, we believe that public blockchain
architectures, despite its limitations, will provide
safer applications of biometrics of greater social
impact. For this reason, the approach studied
experimentally in this paper is based on public
blockchain architectures.
2.1. Biometrics and Blockchain Integration
For integrating biometrics in blockchain sys-
tems we can start by analyzing how the usual
biometric operations can be performed in a
blockchain, so that they cannot be manipulated
or falsified. And, if this is possible, which would
be its cost and performance.
Undoubtedly, the resulting hybrid biometric
system would be more secure. However, this is
not an easy goal to achieve because, as stated in
Section 1.3, all the computation performed in a
public blockchain is accessible to every partici-
pant. This makes necessary to use non-standard
encryption or other protection techniques to man-
age the biometric data in the blockchain. This is
specially relevant when incorporating biometrics
to blockchain, as biometrics are private data in
many cases sensitive. Therefore, as required by
best practices or enforced by legislation (e.g., EU
GDPR), the biometric data should be stored in a
privacy-preserving way (referred to as protected
in the rest of the paper).
Such advanced encryption schemes include
homomorphic encryption and multi-party compu-
tation (MPC). However, although some ongoing
research is adapting these protection schemes for
public blockchains in efficient ways [15], [16],
[17], more work to securely integrate biometrics
in public blockchains is still needed.
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Figure 1. Main modules of a biometric system with indication of its vulnerability points (1 to 8). A public
Blockchain is incorporated in exchange of the Biometric Templates Database in order to improve the security
of the biometric system. This example integration of biometrics and blockchain is studied experimentally in
Section .
That integration of biometrics and blockchain
technologies (public and private) has multiple
complex elements and implications in security,
storage, and beyond. We therefore foresee that
such integration will become a very interesting
and active area of research. The work presented
in this document is intended as a first step in
that direction, especially focused in biometric
template protection.
As a first step for advancing such integration
we begin taking a look at the different modules
of a biometric system, see Fig. 1:
• Sensor: We haven’t identified key use cases
of the integration of biometric sensors in a
blockchain, but this may be possible in the
future, e.g., in IoT systems.
• Feature Extractor: this can be very difficult
and expensive to implement in a blockchain,
as biometric feature extraction algorithms tend
to be complex. Although the variation of this
complexity may be large for different types of
biometrics, it is likely that the execution costs
of running feature extraction in a blockchain
will become prohibitive. In any case, this im-
portant biometric module would be desirable to
be embedded in blockchains for some applica-
tions, and further research is needed towards
it.
• Biometric Templates Database: There are
different approaches for storing the biometric
templates in a blockchain. These approaches
are analyzed in Sect. 2.3.
• Matching: The matching stage can be
achieved by simple operations such as distance
measurements, although in other cases more
complex operations are required (usually, the
higher the complexity of the Feature Extractor
the simpler the Matcher and vice versa). There-
fore, similar comments as discussed before
for the Feature Extractor also apply here. In
Sect. 4.1 we fully implement and analyze two
matching functions, based in Euclidean and
Hamming distances, applied to face biomet-
rics.
2.2. Application: Biometric Template Protection
One important application of blockchain
to biometrics is Biometric Template Protection
(BTP). Biometric systems are known to be vul-
nerable to certain physical [18] and software at-
tacks [4]. Physical attacks to the biometric sensor
can be overcome to some extent with presentation
attack detection (PAD) techniques [19], whereas
software attacks can be prevented using biomet-
ric template protection techniques. However, the
state-of-the-art is still further improvable in many
ways [20], [21], [22].
Fig. 1 depicts the typical stages of a biometric
system (blue color), including all possible points
where a biometric system can be attacked, and our
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Figure 2. Biometric template protection based on feature transformation (Biometric Hashing).
proposed blockchain approach (yellow color) for
improving the protection of biometric templates
against some of the possible software attacks
(gray color). By protecting the traditional tem-
plate storage with a blockchain, the security level
of the resulting biometric system is significantly
increased.
Two main attacks are prevented by directly
storing the biometric templates in the blockchain,
namely: ”Modify templates” in the database
and ”Intercept channel” between database and
matcher (points 6 and 7 in Fig. 1). In most cases,
this would not be enough to protect the privacy of
the biometric data owners to the largest possible
extent. In order to reach the desirable properties
of Irreversibility, Unlinkability and Renewabil-
ity (IUR) of the biometric templates [22], the
schemes developed so far should be combined in
most cases with a more sophisticate Biometric
Template Protection (BTP) scheme that enables
IUR. BTP techniques can be classified as [22]: 1)
Cancelable Biometrics (e.g., Random Projection,
BioHashing, BioConvolving, Irreversible Trans-
formation), 2) Biometric Cryptosystems (Fuzzy
Vault, Fuzzy Commitment, Secure Sketches), and
3) Biometrics in the Encrypted Domain (Homo-
morphic Encryption, Garbled Circuits).
As discussed in [6], the strongest methods
from the previous BTP classification assume
some kind of Supplementary Data (e.g., related
to the parameters of the hashing function in
Biometric Hashing techniques) entered both at the
biometric enrollment and at the biometric match-
ing steps in parallel to the input biometric data
(see Fig. 2). For the specific case of BTP based
on Biometric Hashing [6], [22], the information
stored in the blockchain would be a transforma-
tion of the input unprotected templates, the input
raw biometric data, or a combination of both; and
no other changes to the blockchain architectures
already discussed would be needed. Given those
protected templates, the biometric matching can
then be performed in the hashed domain, like in
standard cryptographic hashing (see Fig. 2). Note
that the matching will be performed similar to
a standard cryptographic hashing, but biometric
hashing is radically different in nature: biometric
hashing aims at providing similar hashes when
small changes appear in the input biometric data
(smaller than the typical intra-user biometric vari-
ability [23]) and uncorrelated hashes for input
changes higher than typical intra-user variability.
Adjusting that transition for the specific biometric
system at hand is the core of an efficient biometric
hashing method.
For more sophisticate BTP methods including
Biometric Cryptosystems or Biometrics in the
Encrypted Domain, specific adaptations to the
blockchain architecture depicted in Fig. 1 may
be also required to process elements related to
the BTP configuration parameters, keys, or new
processing steps included in some BTP methods.
This is out of the scope of the present paper and
will be investigated in future work.
For the experiments reported in the present
paper, we evaluate BTP based on Biometric Hash-
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Figure 3. Biometric systems using data hashing (left) and Merkle trees (right) blockchain storage techniques.
Operation Gas/KB ETH/KB $/KB
READ 6,400 0.000032 $0.005
WRITE 640,000 0.0032 $0.544
Table 2. Non-volatile storage costs in Ethereum. We have
considered a gas price of 1 gwei (1 gwei = 10−9 ETH),
and 1 ETH = $170 (at time of writing, September 2019).
ing for the case of face recognition, which in our
experiments is implemented with a fixed-length
template representation, following the method-
ology developed in [24]. The other biometric
modality considered in the experiments (signature
biometrics) is implemented with a state-of-the-art
variable-length biometric template [25], and this
is left out of the BTP experiments, as variable-
length representations require further develop-
ments beyond the scope of the current paper [21].
2.3. Storage Schemes
In order to discourage its misuse, the cost
of storage space in blockchains is specially ex-
pensive compared to computation. It is therefore
crucial to estimate that cost, in order to minimize
it, by selecting the optimal storage scheme.
There are essentially three main approaches
for data storage in blockchains, which are pre-
sented below in terms of complexity (from lower
to higher), and economic cost (from higher lo
lower):
• Full on-chain storage: all data is stored, as-
is, in the blockchain. For example, biometric
templates could be directly stored as a data
structure through a smart contract. This is
the simplest scheme and therefore, the most
inefficient and costly. As an example, Table
2 depicts the cost of reading and storing 1
Kilobyte of data in Ethereum in terms of gas
units, ether, and US dollars.
• Data hashing: a more efficient approach is to
store the data off-chain and use the blockchain
just as an integrity guarantee due to its intrinsic
immutability. This way, instead of the full
data, only a hash value of it is stored in the
blockchain (through smart contracts). Then,
the complete template can be stored in any
other traditional external storage system (see
Fig. 3 (left)).
This scheme provides a great flexibility as any
platform can be used to store the full set of bio-
metric templates, e.g., public clouds or existing
corporate servers. In any case, to maintain
the distributed spirit, resistance to censorship
and high availability of public blockchains,
distributed storage systems such as IPFS or
Swarm [26] would be desirable in this case. In
addition, it can make use of any cryptographic
hash function, such as the SHA3 family, which
can produce outputs from 224 to 512 bits in
length. In this study, we consider hashes of
256 bits per template, which, in any case, can
greatly reduce storage costs compared to full
on-chain storage.
One drawback of this approach is that it is
still necessary to ensure the availability of the
data stored outside the blockchain. If these data
were lost or tampered, even when this modi-
fication would be always noticed, the viability
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of the system would be compromised.
• Linked data structures: the previous scheme
can be further improved through the use of
linked data structures, e.g., Merkle trees [27].
This specific data structure is widely used in
cryptography and computer science problems
such as database integrity verification, peer-to-
peer networks, and blockchain [10].
A Merkle tree is a binary data structure in
which every node contains the cryptographic
hash of the concatenation of its child nodes
contents. Due to this recursive way of con-
structing itself, the tree root contains statisti-
cal information of the rest of nodes, and the
modification of any node content will cause
the complete change of the value of the root.
This way, the integrity of an arbitrary amount
of data can be efficiently assured by arranging
this data in a Merkle tree form and securely
storing the contents of its root node.
Regarding biometric template protection using
blockchains, this structure would store one
biometric template at each node, assuring the
root node in a smart contract. Therefore, when
a new biometric template is created (after
the enrollment stage), or an existing one is
modified or deleted, the tree is re-calculated
and the new root is updated in the blockchain.
A simplified scheme of this approach can be
found in Fig. 3 (right).
3. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes our experiments inte-
grating biometrics in a blockchain setup. Specif-
ically, we study various practical implementa-
tions of biometric template protection with off-
chain and on-chain matching in the Ropsten
Ethereum testnet. On the one hand, a blockchain-
based scheme is added to the traditional template
database of two biometric systems (face and
signature), with support for the basic operations
such as creation, modification, and deletion of
the biometric templates. On the other hand, two
matching operations (for on-chain matching) are
also implemented for the case of face recognition,
based on Euclidean and Hamming distances.
Two different biometric traits are considered
in this study: i) face, and ii) handwritten signa-
ture. An initial version of this study was presented
in [28]. The evaluated approaches provide the
following advantages:
• The modifications to the existing biometric
architectures are minimal, so that usual bio-
metric techniques and algorithms (e.g., feature
extraction and matching) can be used normally.
• For the case of off-chain matching, the eval-
uated architectures avoid the scalability prob-
lems of public blockchains.
• No need to use complex smart contracts, which
facilitates development and reduces execution
costs. Smart contracts do not implement the
full biometric processing (e.g., biometric fea-
ture extraction is left off-chain), but only the
minimum necessary functions to manage the
storage of the templates.
3.1. Blockchain Smart Contract
The biometric templates are generated and ac-
cessed through the use of a smart contract, which
implements a data structure BiometricTemplate
as a raw array of bytes. This structure
is stored in a mapping (or hash table),
with an identifier number for the user act-
ing as the mapping key mapping(uint =>
BiometricTemplate). The main operations are
described below:
• Creation: receives the user ID, template
data and metadata, and adds a new
BiometricTemplate structure to the
blockchain.
• Modification: modifies the template of an ex-
isting user. For a hash table storage scheme,
this is equivalent to an addition operation.
• Deletion: removes the link between a specific
template and user ID. Due to the public nature
of Ethereum, technically the old template data
remains forever in the blockchain.
• Retrieval: retrieves the BiometricTemplate
structure for a user. This function is a call,
not a transaction as the rest of functions. This
operation is usually read-only (free to execute),
while the previous three operations were po-
tentially state-changing.
The smart contract developed can be verified
with any blockchain explorer like Etherscan2. It
is a basic contract, which does not take care
20x8f737f448de451db9b1c046be7df3b48839673a1
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of security issues, and should be used only for
experimental purposes.
3.2. Biometric Systems
We explore both image-based physiological
face biometrics, and signal-based behavioral sig-
nature biometrics:
• Face: we consider the VGG-Face model, one
of the most popular face recognition systems
based on deep convolutional neural networks
(DCNNs) [29]. In this system images are
propagated through the CNN obtaining the
features at the last fully connected layer. The
final matching score is computed through the
Euclidean distance of the features obtained
from each face image. The dimension of the
original face feature vector is 4,096.
• Dynamic Signature: we consider variable-
length templates consisting of a total of 21
time functions, extracted from the normalised
X and Y spatial coordinates across time [25].
For the similarity computation, Dynamic Time
Warping (DTW) is used to compare the sim-
ilarity between genuine and query input sam-
ples, finding the optimal elastic match among
time sequences that minimises a given distance
measure.
3.3. Biometric Hashing
As indicated in Section 2.2 we will study
experimentally later on Biometric Template Pro-
tection based on Biometric Hashing following the
approach detailed in [24] with a small variation:
instead of using genetic programming for select-
ing the best subset of features, we will apply
SFFS feature subset selection (as also discussed
but not really applied in [24]).
The hashing consists of the concatenation of
binary strings extracted from multiple vector-
quantized feature subsets with some degree of
overlapping features between the different sub-
sets. In the following we describe this hashing
process in more detail.
Given a feature vector x = [x1, . . . , xN ]
with xi ∈ R, a biometric hash
h = [h1, . . . , hL] with hi ∈ {0, 1} of dimension
L is extracted. Let xj with j = 1, . . . , D be
formed by a subset of features of x of dimension
M (M < N ), with possibly overlapping features
for different j. Let Cj be a codebook obtained
by vector quantization of feature subset xj using
a development set of features xjk=1,...,K . We
define h for an input feature vector x as:
h(x) = concat
j=1,...,D
{f(xj, Cj)} (1)
where f is a function that assigns the nearest-
neighbour codewords, and concat(·) denotes the
concatenation of binary strings.
The codebooks Cj are computed with vector
quantization as follows. Let xjk=1,...,K be feature
vector subsets forming a development set. The k-
means algorithm is used to compute the centroids
of the underlying clusters, for a given number of
clusters Q. Then, centroids are ranked based on
their distance to the mean of all centroids. Finally,
binary codewords of size q = log2Q are defined
as the position of each centroid in the ranking
using Gray coding.
The threshold θ represents the maximum
number of overlapped features permitted among
different subsets, and the best subsets are chosen
by using SFFS feature subset selection (minimiz-
ing EER in a development dataset).
The parameters of this Biometric Hashing
have been tuned heuristically starting from the
ones that gave best results in [24], for a final
configuration as follows: N = 100 (size of the
real-valued feature vector), M = 4, and q = 3.
3.4. Databases and Experimental Protocol
Two popular biometric databases are consid-
ered for the analysis of face and signature bio-
metrics: Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [30],
and Biosecure [31].
• Face: experiments are conducted on the LFW
database, which is one of the most popular
datasets used in face recognition with more
than 13,000 face images of famous people
collected from the web. We have used the
aligned dataset where each image was aligned
with funneling techniques.
The VGG-Face pre-trained model was origi-
nally trained with VGG-Face database [29],
and tested using the unrestricted and out-
side training data protocols proposed in LFW
database [30]. Therefore, there is not extra
training for the pre-trained model used here.
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The evaluation results are computed for 6,000
one-to-one comparisons composed of 3,000
genuine pairs (pairs of images from the same
person) and 3,000 impostor pairs (pairs of im-
ages belonging to different persons) following
the protocols from LFW database.
• Dynamic Signature: experiments are con-
ducted on the Biosecure DS2 dataset. This
dataset was captured using a Wacom Intuous
3 digitizing tablet with an inking pen in an
office-like scenario, providing the following
information: X and Y spatial coordinates, pres-
sure, and timestamp (sampling frequency 100
Hz).
In this study, we consider a set of 50 users. For
each user, the first 5 genuine signatures of the
first session are used for training, whereas the
15 genuine signatures of the second session are
left for testing in order to consider the inter-
session variability. Random forgeries are con-
sidered as impostors, comparing the training
signatures with one genuine signature of the
remaining users. The final score is obtained
through the average score of the five one-to-
one comparisons.
4. RESULTS
First, we analyze the system performance of
both face and signature biometric systems regard-
ing the size of the biometrics templates. This
analysis results crucial in terms of economic cost
for the integration of the biometric technology in
blockchain. Fig. 4 shows the system performance
results in terms of Accuracy and Equal Error Rate
(EER) for different sizes of the biometric tem-
plate. For the case of face biometrics (see Fig. 4
(left)), the system performance is very stable
while we gradually remove (randomly) features
from the original feature embedding of size 4096.
VGG-Face is able to obtain a verification rate
with an accuracy (true positive rate) of 89% using
only 100 features (2.5% from the original 4096
features). This behavior shows that there is a very
high redundancy within the feature embedding of
the CNN face models, which makes possible to
obtain very competitive verification performance
while keeping only a small set of features.
Table 3 shows the performance results in
terms of EER (%) comparing the standard unpro-
Case Overlap (θ) # Features EER (%)
Unprotected 0 100 real 11.0
Protected 0 75 binary 13.6
Protected 1 500 binary 8.5
Protected 2 1500 binary 7.3
Table 3. Results in terms of EER (%) for the different
approaches for face recognition, from the unprotected
case to three protected cases with different feature size
(overlap).
tected case (using Euclidean distance for match-
ing), with three approaches using the biometric
template protection scheme already described in
Sect. with three configurations: i) without overlap
(θ = 0) resulting each template in 75 binary
numbers, ii) overlap θ = 1 and then SFFS subset
selection fixed to generate 500 binary features
for each template, and iii) overlap θ = 2 also
using SFFS to generate 1500 binary features per
template. The Hamming distance is applied to
the three protected approaches. The results show
that the first protected approach (θ = 0) increases
the EER by a relative 24%. However when the
feature overlap increases from θ = 0 to θ = 2, the
EER decreases a relative 34% EER going from
11.0% of the unprotected case to 7.3% EER. This
shows the benefits of using the biometric template
approach both in terms of security and system
performance.
For the case of signature biometrics, similar
results are obtained improving the EER values
when reducing the number of features (see Fig. 4
(right)). The best performance of 0.5% EER is
achieved using a total of 9 local functions (total
number of features = 9 local functions × 343
average time samples per local functions = 3,087
features).
4.1. On-chain Face Recognition Matching
In this section, we describe and analyze the
on-chain implementation of a usual biometric
matching stage based on Euclidean (unprotected
case) and Hamming distances (protected cases)
for the case of face recognition.
4.1.1. Euclidean distance. The implemen-
tation of this operation as a smart contract is
specially challenging, due to the lack of native
support for floating point arithmetic. To overcome
this limitation, we represent decimal numbers as
integers (i.e.: 1.12 as 112) and use the Newton-
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Figure 4. System performance results in terms of the biometric template size: (left) face, (right) signature, both
unprotected cases.
Raphson method to obtain the nth-root of d by
solving the equation xn − d = 0 iteratively.
In this way, we can also adjust the cost of
the operation according to the required precision.
The source code of the implementation can be
found in [32]. The results show that the cost of the
calculation of a square root is 23,209 gas units,
and 31,304 (around 0.000031 ETH or $0.00527
for the current ether price) for the calculation of
a complete matching operation.
At first glance it may seem a small value, but
in a real biometric system, the matching operation
must be repeated hundreds or thousands of times.
For example, for a scenario with 10,000 users,
the total cost for the matching operation (the
authentication of each user in the system) would
be slightly greater than $50. Possible solutions
and improvements will be be object of future
research, as discussed in Section 5.
4.1.2. Hamming distance. On the other
hand, Hamming distance is significantly easier
to implement and, as we will study next, it is
virtually free in economic terms.
Every operation implemented in a blockchain
must be optimized as much as possible. In this
case we use an algorithm whose running time
depends on the number of ones present in the
binary form of the given number, instead of
just traversing and counting the number of ones,
obtaining a much better performance.
In contrast to the Euclidean distance, this
distance calculation is simpler, and only uses
bitwise operations. In addition, it does not store
data into the blockchain and, as a result, as a
read-only operation has no execution costs. This
is specially important in a biometric scenario,
where a large number of users can be involved
in matching operations.
4.2. Analysis of Economic Costs
Once we have analyzed the size of the bio-
metric templates, we evaluate in Table 4 the
costs of the different operations over the tem-
plates (creation, modification, deletion, and re-
trieval/matching) in units of gas and US dollars,
for the biometric technologies and blockchain
storage schemes considered.
We first analyze the results for unprotected
templates, both for signature and face biomet-
rics. These schemes should not be directly used
in cases where the privacy of users is to be
preserved (as envisioned and enforced, e.g., by
the EU GDPR). The unprotected experiments are
included mainly for the purpose of setting an
initial reference. As expected, the most efficient
storage scheme is the one based on Merkle trees.
In fact, it is the only one capable of storing any
amount of data for the same cost. The rest of the
schemes would quickly have a prohibitive cost
for the number of templates to be stored in a real
environment.
For example, storing a million of templates
would cost $740,000 for the signature system, and
$60,000 for VGG Face using the full on-chain
storage scheme. Clearly this is not a realistic
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Biometric Operation Storage scheme Perfomance
Scheme Templatesize Full on-chain
Data hashing
(cost per template)
Merkle trees
(cost for any number
of templates)
Execution time
(average)
- - Smart contractdeployment
498,274 gas
($0.06972) 19.19 secs
Signature
Time Functions
3087 x 16 bits
(unprotected)
Creation 4,358,990 gas
($0.741)
86,848 gas
($0.0148)
12.61 secs
Modification 12.85 secs
Deletion 504,322 gas($0.09)
18,850 gas
($0.0032)
Retrieval - - - -
Face
VGG-Face
100 x 32 bits
(unprotected)
Creation 352,912 gas
($0.06)
86,848 gas
($0.0148) 10.53 secsModification
Deletion 49,192 gas($0.0083)
18,850 gas
($0.0032) 16.38 secs
Retrieval - - - -
VGG-Face
75 bits
(protected)
Overlap 0
Creation 66,544 gas
($0.01122)
N/A
10.53 secsModification
Deletion 16,173 gas($0.00289) 16.38 secs
Matching
(Hamming distance) - -
VGG-Face
500 bits
(protected)
Overlap 1
Creation 73,084 gas
($0.01241) 10.53 secsModification
Deletion 21,846 gas($0.00374) 16.38 secs
Matching - -
VGG-Face
1500 bits
(protected)
Overlap 2
Creation 121,272 gas
($0.02057) 10.53 secsModification
Deletion 31,960 gas($0.00544) 16.38 secs
Matching - -
Table 4. Economic costs and performance results for each storage scheme analyzed for unprotected and protected
templates. We have considered a gas price of 1 gwei (1 gwei = 10−9 ETH), and 1 ETH = $170 (accurate at time of
writing, September 2019).
option, discouraged not only in economic terms,
but also for security and performance reasons.
The data hashing scheme would improve sig-
nificantly those figures, because it does not store
the data itself, but only a hash that guarantees the
integrity. For the same scenario, the cost would
be a much more reasonable amount of $14,800
for all the biometric technologies.
Finally, the Merkle trees scheme would imply
a cost of only one cent of dollar ($0.0148) for the
storage of any amount of templates. In addition,
also the modification operation of a template
would have the same cost. However, even for a
biometric system operating in a large corporation
or environment, these costs seem reasonable.
Of course, all these prices could vary greatly
depending on the price of ether, which, as the
rest of cryptocurrencies, usually suffers sharp
increases and falls in price. However, because it
only needs to store 256 bits regardless of the total
volume of data, the Merkle tree scheme would
still have a reasonable cost in any case.
We now look at the protected systems. The
storage costs, even for the most expensive scheme
(Overlap 2), seem reasonable. For a real scenario
with tens of thousands of users, the total cost
would range between $100 and $200. In addi-
tion, the matching function has not associated
execution costs, because the Hamming distance
instead of Euclidean. The calculation of this dis-
tance does not need to permanently store data
into the blockchain and, therefore, as a read-only
operation, is virtually free.
Finally, regarding execution time and perfor-
mance, the experiments show that the proposed
system is also viable. It is important to note that
this is so even considering that the tests have been
conducted in a testnet, where confirmation times
are higher and have greater variability than in the
main network. Times have been measured per-
forming each operation ten times, discarding the
minimum and maximum times, and calculating
the average of the rest.
As can be seen, the execution time is slightly
higher than 10 seconds for the operations of
creation, modification and deletion of templates.
These functions are involved only in the user
management operations (i.e.: user enrollment),
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where these delays seems acceptable in usability
terms.
On the other hand, the matching operation,
the most demanding in performance terms, can
be considered immediate in terms of execution
time, because the request is processed by the local
Ethereum node, and it does not reach the network.
5. FUTURE TRENDS
Results shown in section 4.1 underline the
need for additional techniques to implement
biometric matching and related operations in
blockchain. In addition to the mentioned in pre-
vious sections, other possibilities are: i) zero-
knowledge proofs (ZKP), and ii) state channels,
or off-chain computation.
ZKPs primitives allow that one party proves
to another, even using a public channel and with
presence of an attacker, that they know a secret
value x, without disclosing the value itself. The
process can be even done non-interactive, like
zkSNARKs [33][34]. Indeed, Ethereum has re-
cently added the arithmetic modular primitives
necessary for the integration of this technology.
But, although some recent schemes, as range
ZKPs [35], could be useful for the threshold
checking implicit in the matching operation, all
these operations are still very computationally
intensive and, therefore, expensive when executed
inside a blockchain.
On the other hand, State channels seems
a much more promising technology [36]. This
approach transfers part of the computation outside
the chain, so that the involved parties interact
directly, without the assistance of a blockchain.
Only later, when the exchange of messages and
operations is completed, the result is stored and
verified by the blockchain.
To date, the most illustrative example of state
channels is perhaps payment channels, already
implemented in popular cryptocurrencies such as
Lightning Network for Bitcoin [37]. In contrast
to traditional payment networks, state channels-
based networks allow execution of arbitrary com-
plex smart contracts and, therefore, new possibil-
ities beyond the mere transfer of money.
In biometric systems, state channels could
be applied to the matching operation. This way,
the modules in charge of the user authentication
would operate as usual, but digitally signing each
performed step. At the end of the process, this
approach would provide a fully certified chain of
operations in the blockchain. As only the result
(i.e. user successfully authenticated or not) is
stored, the process would be much cheaper both
in computational and economic terms.
The exact way in which this scheme could be
implemented must be object of further research.
6. CONCLUSION
In this study we have discussed the op-
portunities and challenges in the integration of
blockchain and biometrics, with emphasis in bio-
metric template storage and protection, a key
problem in biometrics still largely unsolved. Key
tradeoffs involved in that integration, namely,
latency, processing time, economic cost, and bio-
metric performance, are experimentally studied
through the implementation of a smart contract on
the Ethereum blockchain platform, with related
code made public in github.3
We have first discussed the main storage
schemes for public blockchains (Ethereum), and
implemented a smart contract for the estimation
of its storage cost. The results obtained have
proved that straightforward schemes such as the
direct storage of the biometric templates on-chain,
or direct data hashing, are not appropriate for
real biometric systems. Nevertheless, when liked
data structures such as Merkle trees are used, the
storage cost has become fixed regardless of the
total volume of data, reducing execution times
(between 10 - 20 seconds for writing operations).
Reading operations (retrieving) of templates are
usually free of cost and very fast to execute,
because they are locally processed.
We have also explored both qualitatively and
quantitatively the main performance and cost
factors of: i) off-chain and on-chain biometric
matching, and ii) storing the biometric templates
with or without template protection. On-chain
matching has been demonstrated to be feasible
and cost-effective for simple matchers based on
Hamming distance. Additionally, we have shown
that adequate template protection can preserve
the privacy of the templates (as recommended
by best practices in privacy-preserving biometrics
and related legislation such as EU GDPR), and at
3https://github.com/BiDAlab/BlockchainBiometrics
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the same time it can maintain and even improve
the biometric matching accuracy with respect to
unprotected templates.
Finally, we have discussed future trends in
blockchain technologies that may be beneficial
for a deeper, more efficient, and more productive
integration of blockchain and biometrics, with
special attention to zero-knowledge proofs (and
variants) and state-channels.
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